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Abstract - We investigate the role of individual interdependencies in tax evasion, arising from congestion on the 
auditing resources available to local tax authorities. Identification exploits a novel method based on comparison 
of the variance of individual behavior — concealed income in this case — at different levels of aggregation, 
within different subpopulations (Graham, 2008). This method allows us to mitigate some of the most severe 
problems that surround identification of neighbourhood effects, at the cost of identifying restrictions that arise 
naturally from our model. We employ a unique dataset of tax audits to about 75,000 self-employed individuals in 
Italy. Surprisingly, this sample is not statistically different from a random sample of taxpayers. We find a social 
multiplier of about 3, meaning that the equilibrium response to a shock that induces an exogenous variation in 
mean concealed income — such as tougher or looser tax enforcement — is about three times the initial average 
response. 
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 Theft—whether from the state, from a fellow citizen or from a looted Jewish
store—was so widespread that in the eyes of many people it ceased to be a crime.
—Tony Judt, Postwar.1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Tax evasion is an endemic phenomenon in virtually any economic system.
Economists have developed two main theoretical approaches to explain it.2
The ﬁrst, initiated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaky (1974),
models taxpayers as amoral expected utility maximizers: rewards and pun-
ishments associated with truthful and untruthful income reports provide
extrinsic motivations for behavior. A shortcoming of the basic version of
this approach is that it predicts too much tax evasion relative to what is
normally observed in advanced economies. The second approach obviates
this diﬃculty by introducing the idea of “tax morale”, i.e. an intrinsic
motivation inducing people to abide by their tax obligations [e.g. Gordon
(1989).]
Even in this diﬀerent guise, the standard approach can hardly accom-
modate evidence of large diﬀerences in tax compliance between units of
observation with comparable monetary incentives and arguably similar val-
ues or intrinsic motivations.3 Consider Italy, for instance. In this country
tax evasion is at top levels among OECD countries, but the picture varies
greatly from region to region and even within regions, which are fairly ho-
mogeneous units.4 Such heterogeneity, however, is not at odds with possible
1Judt (2005), p. 37.
2For a summary of theoretical models and evidence see the two exhaustive surveys by
Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod (2007).
3For instance, the World Values Survey asks individuals all over the world whether it
is justiﬁable to cheat on taxes or not, on a scale ranging from 1 (never justiﬁable) to 10
(always justiﬁable). The means in 1999 were 2.3 in the US and Spain, 2.4 in the UK,
Portugal, and Italy, 2.6 in Switzerland (Swiss ﬁgures refer to 1996). Yet, according to es-
timates of the size of the shadow economy (an imperfect indicator of tax evasion, although
one that is available for most countries) reported by Schneider (2005), the percentage of
GDP that went unreported, on average, between 2002 and 2003 was about 9% in the US
and Switzerland, 12% in the UK, 22% in Spain and Portugal, 27% in Italy.
4Pisani and Polito (2006) estimate that the ratio between concealed and reported
income from productive activities across Italian regions, on average between 1998 and
2002, ranges from 13% in Lombardy and 22% in Emilia Romagna and Veneto, to 66% in
Sicily and 94% in Calabria. The variance across provinces within regions is noticeable.
Just to mention the extremes, in Lombardy the ratio ranges from 5% in the province of
Milan to 34% in the neighboring province of Lodi. In Calabria, it ranges from 53% (Reggio
1homogeneity in fundamentals if there are local externalities in the decision
to cheat on taxes. An important source of such externalities is suggested by
economic models of crime [Sah (1991)]: the perceived probability of being
caught and punished decreases if more people cheat on taxes and only a
ﬁxed numbers of individuals can be audited. In fact this is an implication of
models of tax compliance where the taxpayers and the tax authority inter-
act strategically [e.g. Sánchez and Sobel (1993)], but one that has not been
brought to data yet.5
The goal of this paper is to identify externalities generated by congestion
in auditing resources in a simple structural model of tax evasion. In our
model local tax authorities optimally choose an audit policy, given a certain
amount of auditing resources, in order to induce risk-neutral taxpayers to
report a level of taxable income as close as possible to the true level. In
equilibrium, the perceived individual probability of being audited decreases
with the extent of tax evasion in the jurisdiction. This is so because in the
short run the tax authority’s budget is given.
There are of course other examples of social externalities in tax evasion.
First, tax cheating is an activity that requires the development of particular
skills, and people may learn from others how to conceal their income. Sec-
ond, cheating on taxes may clash with social norms whose strength decreases
with the extent of tax evasion itself [Myles and Naylor (1996)]. Third, infor-
mality of businesses can be transmitted across the production chain if value
added taxes based on the credit-liability system are in use [de Paula and
Scheinkman (2008)].6
These are all are examples of neighborhood eﬀects: decision makers in-
ﬂuence each other directly within certain reference groups [Durlauf (2004)].
For this reason they are also referred to as endogenous social eﬀects [Manski
(1993); Brock and Durlauf (2001a)]. These imply the existence of a social
multiplier: small exogenous changes in fundamentals — such as tougher or
looser tax enforcement — cause relatively large aggregate responses. The
reason is that an exogenous shock aﬀects the level of tax evasion directly via
individuals’ private incentives and indirectly via social interactions. Thus,
the latter can generate relatively large variation in tax evasion across units
Calabria) to 184% (Vibo Valentia).
5This same mechanism is employed in recent theoretical work on the optimal design of
tax schemes in the presence of equilibria characterized by high tax evasion (Bassetto and
Phelan, 2007).
6Interestingly, this possibility is consistent with the low levels of unreported GDP in
the US and Switzerland (see footnote 3), where value-added taxes are not in use and in
use at a very low rate, respectively.
2with similar fundamentals.
We focus on the congestion channel for two reasons. First, it is a parsimo-
nious and testable way of modelling local interdependencies and to formalize
the idea that widespread tax evasion generates a sense of invulnerability in
tax cheaters. Second, and most important from our viewpoint, it allows
us to deﬁne reference groups in a very natural way, thus avoiding arbitrary
assumptions about who interacts with whom: in our model this is deﬁned
by the audit system itself. Of course other kind of externalities may be at
work, an issue on which we will return at the end of the paper.
Our modelling assumptions ﬁt well the nature of our dataset. This is
a unique collection of about 75,000 tax audits to self-employed individuals
(small businesses and professionals) performed in Italy at the beginning of
the 1990s, and become ﬁnal. The audits were performed by local branches
of the ﬁscal authority, who can rely on a given amount of resources and
have jurisdiction on a precise geographic area. We show that, somewhat
surprisingly, this sample is not statistically diﬀerent from a random sample.
Identiﬁcation exploits a novel method, due to Graham (2008), based on
comparison of variances of individual behavior at diﬀerent levels of aggre-
gation within distinct subpopulations. The method is able to overcome a
number of well-know diﬃculties in empirical studies of social interactions,
notably the bias stemming from group unobservables. Furthermore, being
very parsimonious in terms of data requirements, this method is particularly
apt when dealing with scant administrative datasets like the one we work
with. We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive externalities that imply a large social
multiplier: the equilibrium aggregate response to an exogenous shock that
aﬀects average reported income is about three times the initial response.
To our knowledge, the only empirical work that attempts the measure-
ment of social eﬀects in tax evasion is Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval (2007).
This experimental study is complementary to ours for both the kind of data
the authors use as well as the estimation method. The main advantage of
their approach is that it allows genuinely random audit probabilities. On
the other hand, in addition to problems of external validity, lab experiments
on tax evasion can be regarded as akin to surveys, as experimental subjects
are eﬀectively asked to report to the experimenter how much they evade.
The problem is that, as shown in previous research, in surveys about tax
compliance there is virtually no correlation between reported and actual tax
evasion (Ellfers et al., 1987). This is consistent with the zero or even negative
eﬀect Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval ﬁnd. The most important advantage of
our approach is that it is based on audit data that, in the light of our model,
provide a natural deﬁnition of reference groups. Furthermore, our estimatio
3method allows for arbitrary individual- and group-level heterogeneity.
The paper develops as follows. In the next Section we provide basic
intuition into why variances at diﬀerent levels of aggregation reﬂect social
interactions, and how they can help identiﬁcation. In Section 3 we antici-
pate the description of our dataset: this will facilitate the construction and
illustration of the theoretical model, presented in Section 4. The model nat-
urally leads to the econometric framework, which we present in Section 5
along with an illustration of how identiﬁcation is achieved. In Section 6 we
report and discuss our results. Section 7 concludes. Most derivations are
relegated in an Appendix.
2 Variance and Social Interactions
Our work, as well as the identifying procedure it relies on, are closely re-
lated to the pioneering study of Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996),
henceforth GSS, on crime and social interactions. This study was motivated
by evidence of high variance of crime across observationally similar cities in
the US. As we mentioned above, a puzzling aspect of tax evasion common
to other types of illegal activities is ther e m a r k a b l ev a r i a n c ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e s
as well as across regions within countries. A quick inspection of our data
(which we describe in more detail below) reveals that the distribution of
tax evasion across tax jurisdictions in Italy is characterized by large disper-
sion even after conditioning on regions, which are quite homogeneous units.7
This information is summarized in Figures 1a, 1b and 1c, where we plot the
conditional distributions of the share of taxable income that was concealed.
High variance may of course simply reﬂect heterogeneity in fundamentals,
for instance institutional and individual characteristics, at the local level.
The question is how much such diﬀerences can explain. The novel insight
of GSS was that when the observed cross-group variation of individual be-
havior exceeds what can be accounted for by fundamentals (observable and
unobservable), one is left with “excess variance”. In a linear model, as
we illustrate in detail below, such residual variance is entirely due to the
presence of endogenous social interactions among decision makers. This is
intuitive: complementarities among individual choices generate feedbacks
7There are marked diﬀerences across Italian regions with respect to market, cultural,
and social conditions, as well as tax attitudes. Some of these diﬀerences have deep histori-
cal roots, tracing back to the turbulent process of national uniﬁcation in the XIX Century.
In particular Southern Italy (where levels of tax evasion are extremely high) was literally
conquered by rulers of Piedmont — the future royal family. In this part of the country,
taxes were naturally regarded as contributions to an occupying state.
4that amplify the eﬀect of changes in fundamentals on individual behavior.
Straightforward as it sounds, the problem is how to detect excess variance
in practice in the presence of unobservable individual and group characteris-
tics. Formally, the identiﬁcation problem is how to distinguish within-group
correlation that is due to social interactions, from within-group correlation
that is due to other common causes at the individual- and group-level. For
instance, when trying to detect social inﬂuences in tax evasion, one cannot
control for the eﬃciency or corruptibility of local tax oﬃcials, nor for the
level of tax morale. In the context of their empirical application, GSS “ad-
mit that there is considerable uncertainty as to how much of the cross-city
variance is actually explained by urban characteristics” (p. 509). Similar
identiﬁcation problems arise if one looks at individuals rather than larger
units (Manski, 1993; Moﬃtt, 2001). In these circumstances, one needs iden-
tifying assumptions. GSS took the following route:
In this paper we face an identiﬁcation problem that can be solved
either with an assumption about the functional form of unob-
served heterogeneity or by assuming a “reasonable” level of that
heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the reader may not ﬁnd either as-
sumption plausible, in which case our empirical work must be
seen as identifying the magnitude of some combination of social
interactions and unobserved heterogeneity. (p. 517)
The identiﬁcation route we take in this paper, due to Graham (2008),
develops the framework of GSS into a more powerful statistical method, al-
though essentially restricted to a linear world. The central insight of this
method is that social interactions amplify the between-group variance of
individual behavior with respect to the within-group variance. Comparing
such variances within distinct subpopulations allows to distill the portion of
cross-group variation that is due to social interactions only. This is possible
as long as one of the dimensions deﬁning subpopulations does not aﬀect
certain components of the covariance matrix of individual behavior, which
can be conveniently interpreted as reﬂecting sorting of individuals across
groups, matching between individuals and group-level attributes, and the
variance of the latter. In other words, one needs an instrument that inﬂu-
ences the between-group variance only through the within-group variance,
i.e. an exogenous variation.8 Our model suggests such an instrument. The
8This property is not conﬁned to variances: Manacorda (2006) uses the ratio between
eﬀects at diﬀerent levels of aggregation (within- and between-families in this case) to
identify intra-family externalities in children’s propensity to enter the labor market.
5reason why we believe this method is more powerful than the one originally
used by GSS is that it is robust to arbitrary unobservable heterogeneity, it
works under milder identifying assumptions, and so is able to considerably
mitigate the “unfortunately” part in the above quotation.
3D a t a
Before illustrating the model and the identiﬁcation strategy, we brieﬂyd e -
scribe the data we use. This anticipation will facilitate the illustration of
our modelling strategy and identifying assumptions.
3.1 A sample of tax audits
We employ a cross-section of ordinary tax audits concerning about 75,000
self-employed individuals in Italy. These are essentially small individual
businesses and professionals. The audits were performed by the Italian
Guardia di Finanza (Tax Police, a special force dependent on the Ministry
of the Economy and Finance that is in charge of tax audits in Italy) at the
beginning of the 1990s and are now ﬁnal, after all possible appeals. There-
fore, our dataset is the universe of tax audits in a certain period. Individuals
belong to local tax jurisdictions. These are deﬁned by the sphere of compe-
tence of local branches of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, which
are responsible for tax management and audits. There are about 400 tax
jurisdictions in Italy: each of them comprises one or more municipalities, or
a portion of a large city.
In addition to such geographic information, we observe reported income
for the purposes of personal income tax (Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone
Fisiche, IRPEF), as well as the amount found by the audit. We take the
latter to be an accurate estimate of actual income. We also observe the sec-
tor of economic activity, tax deductions (allowances) and tax credit. For the
last two variables we know the amount claimed and the amount the taxpayer
was actually entitled to according to the tax authority. Under the Italian tax
code, tax allowances typically include deductions for compulsory contribu-
tions to pension funds and charitable deductions. On the other hand, a tax
credit is typically granted for dependents, and for special personal expenses
(a certain percentage of health expenses and mortgage interests). Moreover,
and quite crucially for our identiﬁcation strategy, there are de facto distinct
audit processes for taxable income and tax credits. Since the main compo-
nent of the latter consists of a credit for dependents with low income, the
tax authority can easily verify whether a taxpayers claimed the correct tax
6credit or not. Such checks are performed routinely and essentially at no cost
by simply cross-checking information reported by the taxpayer with family
information at the register and dependents’ income in the tax authority’s
database. This is a fundamental diﬀerence with audits on taxable income,
which are instead performed only on a small fraction of cases, as reported in
Table 1.9 Consistently with this fact, we observe that while in our dataset
only one in four individuals correctly reports taxable income, as many as
90% correctly report the tax credit they are entitled to.
Tables 1-3 report summary statistics. Tax evasion turns out to be re-
markably high among Italian self-employed that were audited: only 26% of
them correctly reported taxable income, and concealed income (the diﬀer-
ence between actual and reported taxable income) is more than 45% the
average taxable income. However, there is considerable variability in ﬁs-
cal non-compliance among diﬀerent categories of taxpayers across regions
and sectors of economic activity. In general we observe higher rates of non-
compliance in central and southern regions and among taxpayers employed
in agriculture and commerce and among craftsmen.
3 . 2 I st h i sar a n d o ms a m p l e ?
Tax audits, of course, are not random: tax authorities audit taxpayers on
the basis of precise criteria, and we should expect tax cheaters to be over-
sampled. These criteria were not made public in Italy at the time our data
refer to. If these were known, we could construct sampling weights and base
our estimates on consistent estimators of population moments: this could be
enough to correct for this basic form of sample selection.10 Since we cannot
do this, one may wonder whether we can draw any credible inference.
We claim that our sample is not too far from a random sample, and we
oﬀer two pieces of evidence.
First, Schneider (2005) estimates that at the end of the 1990s the size of
the shadow economy in Italy was about 23% of GDP. We want to compare
this ﬁgure to what we observe in our sample. In order to do so, we must
correct the ratio to take into account the we work with a sample of self-
employed individuals. Ideally, we would like to know what is the percentage
of the shadow economy in the self-employment sector. This is very hard to
assess, but we can adjust Schneider’s estimate to get closer to the number
of interest. We must ﬁrst exclude the fraction of GDP that originates in the
9We are grateful to Giorgio Zanella for directing our attention to such an important
institutional diﬀerence.
10See Pfeﬀerman (1993) and references therein.
7public sector: this is an innocuous adjustment of the denominator because
by deﬁnition this portion cannot originate in the informal sector. In the
early 1990s, this was about 28% in Italy (20% from consumption expendi-
ture by general government, and 8% from collective consumption). Next,
Schneider’s deﬁnition of the shadow economy explicitly excludes illegal ac-
tivities. However, according to recent estimates, large criminal organizations
in Italy11 may account for an astonishing 15% of GDP. At least part of this
ends up in oﬃcial statistics, because in Italy they are corrected for the black
economy. A conservative estimate is 2%. By correspondingly reducing the
measure of GDP in Schneider’s ratio, we make numerator and denominator
consistent. Therefore, even without further adjustments12, for comparison
with our sample Schneider’s ﬁgure is 0.23/(1−.28−.2) ≈ 33%. In our data,
the corresponding measure is the fraction of total income (i.e. taxable plus
non-taxable income) that goes unreported. This is 37%. We believe that the
diﬀerence between these two numbers should be much larger if tax cheaters
were considerably over-represented in our sample.
Second, and consistently with this belief, in our data the distribution of
economic activities and the distribution of tax audits across these same
sectors are statistically indistinguishable, in all regions. We performed
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests by region, and we can never reject the hypothesis
that the two distributions are equal. The smallest p-value is 0.83, with the
majority above 0.99.
These two pieces of evidence suggest that our sample, somewhat sur-
prisingly, is not far from a random sample of taxpayers. Our interpretation
is that this reﬂects the inherent diﬃculties tax authorities face in detecting
tax cheaters. That is, although auditing activities are designed to select
individuals who are ex-ante more likely to evade taxes — a key implication
of theoretical models of optimal enforcement — the outcome is ex-post not
too far from random sampling.
4 The Model
Our theoretical framework follows by and large Sánchez and Sobel (1993).
Consider a population of N taxpayers, indexed by i =1 ,...,N. Consistently
with our data, we take these to be individual producers distributed across
11The estimates we refer to aggregate Maﬁa, Camorra, ’Ndrangheta, and Sacra Corona
Unita.
12The fraction of employment and corporate income that originates in the informal sec-
tor is likely to be considerably smaller than the corresponding fraction of self-employment
income [Slemrod (2007)]
8G groups, indexed by g =1 ,...,G. Each group has ﬁxed size, denoted Ng,
with boundaries deﬁned by the jurisdiction of local tax authorities, who are
in charge of tax enforcement. Auditing resources available to tax authority
g amount to Ag. Taxpayers are allowed to move across jurisdictions, as we
model below. A taxpayer i whose taxable income is yi (i.e. gross income
minus tax allowances the individual is entitled to) reports an amount yR
i






and pays a tax at an exogenous ﬂat rate t on reported income. Taxable
income is private information and the tax rate is exogenously determined.
The tax authority can audit income at the cost of a>0 per audit. When
an individual is audited, the tax authority observes taxable income. If yR
i ≥
yi, i.e. at least the due tax was paid, nothing happens. If yR
i <y i,i . e .
income was partly concealed, the residual due tax must be paid and a ﬁne is
imposed on the unpaid tax, at an exogenous rate f>0. Furthermore, the
taxpayer deducts a tax credit from due tax. We denote with ci the total tax
credit taxpayer i is entitled to, and with cR
i t h ea m o u n th ec l a i m s ,f a c i n g





and a ﬁne rate φ>0. Consistently
with our data, we treat the two audit policies as separate, and we assume
that only income audits are costly.
The taxpayer’s problem is to choose how much taxable income to report,
given the audit policies for taxable income and the tax credit, so to minimize
expected payment. The tax authority’s problem is to choose such audit
policies, given its budget and the optimal behavior of the taxpayer, so to
maximize expected revenue within its jurisdiction. The expectation is taken
with respect to the marginal distributions of income and tax credit, denoted
F and H, conditional on individual and jurisdiction-speciﬁc information,















































are the optimal audit probabilities chosen by
the tax authority, i.e. solve:
13We implicitly condition on truthful or under-reporting, becuase over-reporting is




































In other words, the tax authority cannot exceed its budget, in terms of
expected number of audits. Since the cost of suditing the claimed tax credit
is zero, it is optimal to set qig =1 . As a consequence, the taxpayer truthfully
reports the tax credit, or cR
i = ci. Both these facts replicate what we observe
in our data, as illustrated in the previous Section. As a consequence, the
tax credit is uniformative for the tax authority.
At an interior optimum, the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for a min-
imum of the taxpayer’s objective balance the expected marginal cost and
beneﬁt of under-reporting income and over-reporting tax credits, respec-






























As for the optimal pig, the tax authority can always elicit a truthful
report by setting pig =( 1+f)
−1.15 However, in any interesting situation
the budget constraint is binding. In this case, Sánchez and Sobel (1993) show
that under mild regularity conditions the tax authority optimally divides
taxpayers into at most three income classes. Our model diﬀers from theirs
because we allow for rich individual and group-level heterogeneity — this is
needed for the empirical analysis. However, the nature of the solution is the
same because of the additive form of the tax authority’s objective. In this
case, income classes are conditional on individual and group information:
if taxpayer i in jurisdiction g reports income below a threshold yig he is
audited with probability (1 + f)
−1;i fh er e p o r t sa b o v eat h r e s h o l dyig he
is not audited; if he reports an amount in-between he is audited with some
constant probability πig.T h i si si l l u s t r a t e di nF i g u r e1 .
14As long as ∂pig/∂y
R
i ≤ 0,a n d∂qig/∂c
R
i ≤ 0, which makes intuitive sense and will in
fact be the case in equilibrium, the second order condition for a minimum is satisﬁed.
15F o ra n yt a x p a y e r ,t h i si st h ev a l u eo fpig that balances expected income under truthful
reporting and expected income under tax evasion.
10Figure 1. Optimal audit probability.
The level of the thresholds, and so of πig, are of course endogenous
and depend on the other model parameters. In particular, since at the
optimum pig is non increasing in yR
i and the resource constraint is binding,
as marginal taxpayers — i.e. taxpayers at the right of the two thresholds —
reduce reported income the probability that they are audited increases, and
so the probability that the other taxpayers in the jurisdiction are audited
must decrease. This is best seen if we rewrite the budget constraint of the






















where I[·] is the indicator function, equal to one if the proposition inside
the brackets is true and zero otherwise. Therefore, pig must be increasing in
the amount reported by other taxpayers, a vector denoted yR
−i.T h i si st h e
fundamental externality we want to stress. Figure 2, below, illustrates: given
true income, when everybody except taxpayer i in the jurisdiction conceals
more, and auditing resources are given, the tax authority becomes more
lenient towards taxpayer i. More generally, the presence of such externality







−i,χ i,χ −i,t,f,Υg,A g
¢
,( 4 )
11where variables indexed by −i contain information about all individuals in
jurisdiction g except i.T h i se x p r e s s i o nc l a r i ﬁes in what sense a model àl a
Sánchez and Sobel (1993) generates neighborhood eﬀects in tax evasion.
Figure 2. Eﬀect of increased tax evasion
Although taxpayers behave optimally, we do not assume that they know
the functional form, let alone the value, of this probability function: tax
authorities do not disclose their exact auditing criteria, and even expert
researchers have a hard time ﬁguring them out. Like in the pioneering
model of Sah (1991), we simply assume the taxpayer acts optimally on the
basis of a perceived, or inferred, probability of audit. We allow taxpayers to
behave like econometricians and use the best linear predictor:
b p∗
ig = b0 + b1yR
i + b2yR
g + b3χi + b4Zg,( 5 )
where yR




collects group-level, contextual, variables, χg is the group-level averages of
χi,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcients are generated by an hypothetical linear projection.
The use of group-level means reﬂects the idea that by observing what is
happening in the jurisdiction, or in communicating with other taxpayers,
an individual can inexpensively estimate “average” conditions around him,
while it would be too costly to collect speciﬁc information about any single
12taxpayer in the group.16 Our model imposes restrictions on the sign of b1
and b2:t h e ﬁrst is negative, and the second is positive. Figure 3 shows
such linear prediction function and its shift following an increase in local
tax evasion.
Figure 3. Optimal and optimally predicted audit probability
We next illustrate key implications of the model, which we will exploit for
identiﬁcation. First, the optimal audit policy deﬁnes a value function for the
tax authority, denoted R(Ag), i.e. the maximum expected revenue raised
in location g. Suppose a revenue-maximizing central government allocates






R(Ag),s . t .
P
g
Ai ≤ A,( 6 )
where A denotes an exogenous amount of resources the central government
allocates to tax enforcement. Denote with cg the jurisdiction average tax







1, inspection of problem (6) allows to establish the following:
Proposition 1 Allocation of auditing resources is independent of cg.
16Casual conversations with self-employed individuals suggest that they have a fairly
accurate perception of how much tax evasion there is in their area.
13The reason is of course that the tax credit is uniformative for the tax
authority.
Second, we allow individuals to sort across jurisdictions for the purpose
of minimizing expected payment. Since the tax rate is constant, this is





ig,s . t . g ≤ G.( 7 )
By inspection of this problem and equation (4), one can establish the
following — for the same reason underlying Proposition 1:
Proposition 2 Sorting of taxpayers across jurisdictions is independent of
cg.
Claims 1 and 2, in turn, imply the following:
Proposition 3 Contextual variables in Zg are independent of cg.
Proposition 4 Matching between the contextual variables in Zg and tax-
payer’s characteristics is independent of cg.
Finally, we illustrate how this framework leads to the estimating equa-
tion. In the Appendix we show that replacing the predicted, or perceived,
probability of an audit (5) into the taxpayer’s ﬁrst-order condition (2), the
latter boils down to the well-known linear-in-means behavioral equation of
Manski (1993):
ei = βXi + δYg + Jeg,( 8 )
where β, δ,a n dJ are coeﬃcients, Xi ≡ (1,y i,χ i), Yg ≡ (yg,Z g),a n deg
and yg are group-averages of the corresponding individual-level variables.
Equation (8) is a reaction-function, and J is the main parameter of interest,
because it measures externalities across taxpayers. In Manski’s (1993) ter-
minology it captures endogenous social interactions, since eg is endogenously
determined. This is the parameter we want to estimate. As per derivation,
all of the parameters in (8) admit a structural interpretation. In particular,
as shown in the Appendix, J ≡− b2/2b1 > 0. This is the slope of optimal
individual concealed income with respect to the group-level average, and
reﬂects the distinct and opposite eﬀects of individual (b1) and average (b2)
reported income on the perceived probability of an audit. Such probability
14decreases with average concealed income, and so it is optimal to conceal less
income if others report more. The individual eﬀect, in turn, dampens the
social incentive to report more, because the more an individual reports the
lower the perceived probability of an audit. The last step needed to solve
the model is to explicitly compute average concealed income in jurisdiction
g: eg = N−1
g
P
i ei = βXg + δYg + Jeg,a n ds o
eg = γβXg + γδYg,( 9 )
where Xg is the jurisdiction-level mean of Xi,a n dγ ≡ (1 − J)
−1. The model
has a unique Nash equilibrium characterized by the following individual level
of concealed income, obtained by replacing (9) into (8):
ei = βXi +( γ − 1)βXg + γδYg, (10)
since Jγ ≡ γ −1. Parameter γ is the social multiplier. Notice that stability
requires J ≤ 1, otherwise concealed income would explode following a tiny
shock. Therefore, γ ≥ 1.I f γ =1 ,i . e . J =0 , there are no externalities,
and others’ characteristics (Xg) are irrelevant in equilibrium. The social
multiplier is the limit of the series of feedbacks triggered by an exogenous
variation in contextual or average individual characteristics within a group.
If such exogenous variation generates an initial, i.e. before the feedbacks
associated with social interactions, 1% change in average concealed income
and J>0, then in equilibrium, i.e. after feedbacks are exhausted, the
variation is γ%, which is larger than the initial response. Eﬀectively, the
social multiplier is a sort of “autoelasticity” of average behavior.17 Suppose
that the tax authority gives taxpayers to understand that it will be looser
in enforcing norms against evasion, so that each individual is encouraged to
conceal x% more. When people realize that tax evasion actually increased,
they perceive a lower probability of detection and optimally conceal more,
which further increases the average, and so on. The ﬁnal increase in average
concealed income is γx%. On the contrary, suppose the government wishes
to reduce tax evasion, and targets a reduction of z% in average concealed
income. Then it is enough to increase auditing resources just enough to
induce an average reduction of just (z/γ)%.
17Equivalently, it is the ratio between the average cumulative response and the initial in-
dividual response following an exogenous shock (see Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman,
2003). In this sense, although it might look inappropriate to use an absolute measure
of tax evasion rather than a relative measure (e.g. the share of income that goes unre-
ported), it is not obvious how to interpret the social multiplier in the second case (because
in relative terms, average evasion is not the mean of the individual levels)
155I d e n t i ﬁcation
The inferential problem is to estimate the endogenous social interactions co-
eﬃcient, i.e. J in structural equation (8), and the implied social multiplier,
γ. The reason why identiﬁcation is a concern can be illustrated as follows.
Equations (8) and (9) form a system of simultaneous equations. Identiﬁ-
cation of the ﬁrst equation, and so of J, requires an exclusion restriction
in the form of a variable that aﬀects average but not individual concealed
income. This is the essence of the ‘reﬂection problem’ [Manski (1993)], i.e.
the problem of separating the eﬀect of mutual inﬂuences (γ)f r o mt h ee f -
fect of common inﬂuences (contextual and correlated eﬀects δ and β)i n
the reduced form, equation (10). Since the same contextual controls, Yg,
necessarily appear in both equations, such a restriction must consist of an
individual eﬀect whose average is not a contextual eﬀect, that is a variable
in Xg that is not in Yg [Brock and Durlauf (2001b)]. Even if such an in-
strument were available there are at least two additional diﬃculties. First,
since individuals sort across jurisdictions, problem (7), all of the group-level
variables, not only average concealed income, are endogenous. Second, a
number of unobservable group-level eﬀects work as confounding factors. For
instance, how does one control for the eﬃciency and corruptibility of local
tax oﬃcials? Such unobserved group eﬀect would be wrongly interpreted as
the eﬀect of social interactions.
The method devised by Graham (2008) allows to considerably mitigate
all of these problems. Let us consider, in addition to individual concealed
income ei, the mean tax credit cg, and a vector Wg containing information
that is appropriate for the problem at hand — as we describe below.
Next, we rewrite the equilibrium equation (10) in error-component form,
assuming that anything except ei, cg,a n dWg is observable. Deﬁne αg ≡ dYg
as group-level heterogeneity (after purging it from Wg, an innocuous abuse
of notation), εi ≡ cXi as individual-level heterogeneity18,a n dεg ≡ cXg as
the group-level average of the latter. Then equation (10) and (9) become:
ei = γαg + εi +( γ − 1)εg, (11)
eg = γ (αg + εg). (12)
Equation (11) is slightly diﬀerent from Graham’s behavioral equation,
where group-level heterogeneity, αg, is not ampliﬁed by the social multiplier,
18This way of modeling individual heterogeneity makes our model consistent with the-
ories allowing for diﬀerent types of taxpayers motivations.
16γ. Such lack of ampliﬁcation exclude that shocks to contextual variables may
trigger a chain of feedbacks between group and individual behavior, which
is instead the case in our framework.19 The reason is that equation (11)
is derived from an economic model in which altering institutional variables
leads to changes in behavior that are subsequently propagated by social
interactions. If one posits a behavioral equation in which interactions occur
directly via average individual characteristics (rather than indirectly in the
reduced form, like in our model), then contextual variables that are not
captured by average individual characteristics cannot generate multiplier
eﬀects. Correspondingly, Graham (2008) recognizes that in his framework
γ may be a composite function of multiple ‘structural’ param-
eters. In Manski (1993) it depends on the strength of what he
terms ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ social eﬀects. (p. 5, footnote
6).
Thanks to the explicit modeling of the mechanism generating social in-
teractions, the social multiplier we identify has a sharper interpretation, i.e.
it is a known function of structural parameters that reﬂects endogenous so-
cial interactions only. Therefore it is the exact measure of the equilibrium
eﬀect of exogenous shocks that alter individual behavior.
Let us denote by σ2
ε (cg,W g) the variance of individual heterogeneity, con-
ditional on the mean tax credit and other information in Wg,b yσεε (cg,W g)
the corresponding conditional covariance across individuals, by σ2
α (cg,W g)
the conditional variance of group-level heterogeneity, and by σαε (cg,W g) its
conditional covariance with individual level heterogeneity. Notice that σεε is
a measure of the degree of sorting of taxpayers across jurisdictions: it should
be zero if they were randomly assigned. Similarly, σ2
α reﬂects the variance of
unobserved characteristics of the tax authority (such as the eﬃciency of tax
oﬃcials and the resources they can rely on), as well as other institutional,
cultural, or market characteristics common to all taxpayers in a jurisdiction.
Finally, σαε reﬂects the degree of matching between such characteristics and
taxpayers. This covariance is non-zero when, for instance, resources are al-
located to tax authorities on the basis of taxpayers’ characteristics, or when
taxpayers sort across jurisdictions on the basis of the eﬃciency of the tax
authority. Propositions 1, 2 and 4 allow us to establish the following:
19For instance, an exogenous change in the quality of tax oﬃcials in a certain jurisdic-
tion may trigger a change in the perception of the audit probabilities and a sequence of
feedbacks between individuals thus leading to a diﬀerent equilibrium level of tax evasion.
17Proposition 5 σ2
α (cg,W g), σαε (cg,W g),a n dσεε (cg,W g) are all indepen-
dent of cg.
In other words, the variation in the quality of tax oﬃcials and other
relevant contextual and institutional characteristics, as well as the matching
of tax oﬃcials with taxpayers and sorting of the latter across jurisdictions,
while possibly dependent on the variables included in Wg are not aﬀected by
the mean tax credit. This is true in our model because the tax credit contains
no useful information to detect tax evasion. In fact the correlation between
individual tax evasion and individual tax credit in our data is extremely low
(0.01). Proposition 5 provides a restriction that allows identiﬁcation,20 as
we illustrate next following Graham (2008) closely.
Equations (11) and (12) express concealed income at diﬀerent levels of
aggregation. We show in the appendix that after conditioning on cg and Wg
and using Proposition 5, the within-group variance of concealed income in
jurisdiction g, denoted V w
g , and the corresponding between-group variance,
denoted V b











g = γ2 ¡
σ2




These conditional variances exhibit an important pattern. First, the
within-group variance is independent of social interactions and group-level
heterogeneity. This is quite intuitive. For instance, if there are diﬀerences
in individual tax evasion in a jurisdiction where tax oﬃcials are corrupt or
people inﬂuence each other, such variability of course cannot be ascribed to
corruption or interactions, but only to diﬀerences between individuals and
to covariance between individual characteristics generated by the process of
sorting. Second, the between-group variance depends on group heterogeneity
and is ampliﬁed by social interactions, when these are present (i.e. γ>1).
This is also intuitive. For instance, part of the variability of tax evasion
between two groups, one where tax oﬃcials are corrupt and one where they
are not, must depend on corruption, as well as on the fact that dishonest
20One may still be concerned about people sorting across jurisdictions on the basis of
personal characteristics summarized by the tax credit. For instance, families with many
children may tend to live in the same residential areas. This remains an issue, but we
notice that it is considerably mitigated by the fact that the size of jurisdictions in our
data is large enough to encompass entire cities or large portions of them.
18taxpayers may tend to locate where tax oﬃcials are more easily corrupt-
ible. However, since the level of tax evasion in a group depends on social
interactions, which alters contextual diﬀerences, so must be for cross-group
variation. This was exactly the original intuition of Glaeser, Sacerdote, and
Scheinkman (1996): the presence of social interactions generates a wedge
between the variance of illegal behavior at diﬀerent levels of aggregation. In
our model the size of the wedge is proportional to γ2, a fact that oﬀers a
lever for identiﬁcation.
If we assume that the portion of the between-group variance that is
independent of the within-group variance can be written as a linear function
of Wg,i . e .
γ2 ¡
σ2
α (Wg)+2 σαε (Wg)+σεε (Wg)
¢
= θWg, (15)
and if we rewrite variances as expectations of appropriate statistics Gw
g and
Gb














































The latter provides the basis for estimating γ2 by GMM. The average
tax credit works as an instrument: Proposition 5 implies that it aﬀects the
between-group variance of concealed income only through the within-group
variance, as equations (13) and (14) illustrate, i.e. provides an exogenous
variation. The reason why it inﬂuences the within-group variance — a rank
19condition we can test21 —i st h a ti ta ﬀects the variance of individual hetero-
geneity.22 Eﬀectively cg restricts the covariance matrix of cross-group tax
evasion. Therefore, as well illustrated by Durlauf and Tanaka (2008), such
a covariance restriction parallels the exclusion restriction needed to identify
social interactions in a regression framework based on model (8).
This identiﬁcation strategy is robust to arbitrary individual and group-
level unobservables. Under our identifying assumptions, unobservables may
arbitrarily aﬀect average tax evasion, as well as the within- and cross-group
variances. What matters is the relation between the two, equation (18): we
know that the slope, a function of the wedge between variances at diﬀerent
levels of aggregation, identiﬁes the social multiplier, regardless of whether
unobservables aﬀect the level of this function, or the intercept.
By writing the unconditional moment restriction like in (20) we are not
addressing the issue of the optimal set of instruments, so our estimates will
be consistent but not necessarily eﬃcient.23 Feasibility requires an estimate
of Gb
g: we use the predicted value from the regression of ei on a constant,
cg, all the variables in Wg, and their squares. After identifying γ2,t h e
delta method can then be used to recover the structural parameter J —t h e
endogenous social interactions coeﬃcient — as well as its standard error.24
6R e s u l t s
Our discussion above suggests to include in Wg information that may af-
fect sorting, matching, and allocation of auditing resources. The following
information seems appropriate given the limitations of our dataset and the
ﬁnding that the distribution of tax audits across sectors is indistinguishable
from random distribution. One, an indicator for whether the jurisdiction is
large or small relative to the regional median. Two, an indicator for whether


















22Remember that in our sample a tax credit is granted for things such as dependents,
health expenses, mortgage interests. At the same time, in our data the average tax credit
i se s s e n t i a l l yu n c o r r e l a t e dw i t hm e a nt a x a b l ei n c o m ea n dm e a nc o n c e a l e di n c o m e ,w h i c h
reinforces our conﬁdence in the quality of the instrument.













24Notice that the model (that is, equation (18)) is linear and is exactly identiﬁed. There-
fore, the GMM estimator of γ
2 associated with the moment restrictions in (20) is identical
to the linear instrumental variables estimator.
20the local share of aggregate taxable income that is reported is above or below
the regional share. For instance, more eﬃcient tax oﬃcials may be assigned
to larger jurisdictions, as well as to jurisdictions that do not generate enough
revenue relative to the region. Three, a South dummy: Table 1 indicates
that tax evasion is much more relevant in Southern than in Northern Italy.
It is quite intuitive that this additional variable may aﬀect at least matching
and allocation of resources.
Our results are reported in Table 4 below. We estimate, across two
alternative speciﬁcations, an endogenous social interactions coeﬃcient rang-
ing from 0.65 to 0.69, which implies a social multiplier ranging from 2.9
to 3.2. Column 1 contains our baseline speciﬁcation, without regional con-
trol. Column 2 adds regional information. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic and
the coeﬃcient on the instrument at ﬁrst stage indicate that the instrument
secures identiﬁcation. However, the F-statistic may raise concerns about
weak identiﬁcation. In order to deal with these residual concerns, we follow
the simple strategy suggested by Angrist and Krueger (2001) and look at the
reduced form equations. The coeﬃcient on the instrument in the reduced
form is reported towards the end of Table 4 (Reduced form: Coeﬃcient on
cg). This must be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero to dispel the presumption
that there are no social interactions or that the instrument is weak. This is




(robust s.e.) (0.08) (0.11)
γ 3.21 2.89




Coeﬃcient on cg 18.14 26.34
(robust s.e.) (7.80) (11.26)
Reduced form:
Coeﬃcient on cg 186.90 220.63
(robust s.e.) (83.65) (108.87)
Regional control no yes
Jurisdictions: 412 412
Individuals: 78,863 78,863
21These estimates imply a strong amplifying role of social interactions: an
exogenous shock altering concealed income independently across individu-
als, produces an equilibrium variation that is about three times the initial
response. This strong eﬀect reﬂects the importance of reported income in
the jurisdiction with respect to the perceived probability of an audit: recall
the structural expression for the social interactions coeﬃcient, J = −b1/2b2,
where b1 and b2 are the eﬀects of own and average report, respectively, on
the perceived probability of an audit. Our estimates imply that, in absolute
value, b2 is 30-40% larger than b1: for a dishonest taxpayer, doing business
in a jurisdiction where other taxpayers tend to report high income is per-
ceived to be more risky than reporting low income, which is suggestive of
the importance of social externalities.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Despite social externalities constitute a plausible explanation for the high
variation of tax compliance, empirical research on tax evasion has largely
ignored this possible determinant of individual behavior. This lack of empir-
ical research is largely due to the fact that social interactions are extremely
diﬃcult to identify. In this paper we have exploited a method recently
devised by Graham (2008) that allows to overcome some of the most worry-
ing aspects of identiﬁcation, namely group unobservables and self-selection.
In our application, this “variance method” requires restrictions on the co-
variance matrix of concealed income that parallel the assumptions needed
to identify social interactions based on the traditional “regression method”
(Durlauf and Tanaka, 2008). Such restrictions arise naturally in our appli-
cation thanks to an institutional property of the tax audit system in Italy:
contrary to income reports, claims to a tax credit are routinely and costlessly
audited.
An important diﬀerence between the two tests is that the variance method,
being based on group-level data, is more parsimonious in terms of data
requirements and so mitigates the problem of individual and group unob-
servables, as well as self-selection, that aﬀect the regression method. We
regard these as important advantages. Thanks to linearity, which follows
from risk-neutrality of individual entrepreneurs and their attempt to opti-
mally forecast audit probabilities, we are able to provide a simple structural
interpretation of our estimates. The driving force is the externality deriv-
ing from the resource constraint of local tax authorities. Two remarks are
necessary about this assumption.
22First, it may sound odd to refer to such interdependencies as social inter-
actions. However, ‘social’ refers to the particular nature of these external-
ities, which aﬀect only individuals belonging to the same group, regardless
of whether the forces that generate the externalities are genuinely ‘social’ or
more ‘technological’, like in our model. In either case the meaning and the
policy implications of the multiplier eﬀects we identify are unaﬀected.
Second, we focus on only one of the various mechanisms that may gener-
ate social interdependency in tax evasion. Of course our empirical investiga-
tion remains valid whatever the mechanism that generates salience of social
interactions in tax evasion. At worst, our estimate reﬂects the compound
eﬀect of diﬀerent forces operating at the level of tax jurisdictions. Only
the structural interpretation of the social multiplier is tied to the particular
mechanism we focus on.
Conditional on our identifying assumption, our work suggests a social
multiplier of about 3: reducing the extent of tax evasion is less costly than
it is commonly thought. From a methodological viewpoint, we regard our
work as an important example of how the social interactions literature can
make concrete progress in an empirical direction.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of equation (8)
Replace ﬁrst ∂b p∗
ig/∂yR
i = b1, from equation (5), into (2). Then the latter
becomes:
fpig =( 1− pig)+b1 (1 + f)ei,
or, equivalently, collecting terms and dividing both sides by (1 + f):
pig =( 1+f)
−1 + b1ei.
Next, replace (5) into this expression. From the deﬁnition of concealed
income, we can also replace yR
i ≡ yi − ei and yR
g ≡ yg − eg and obtain:
b0 + b1yi − b1ei + b2yg − b2eg + b3ti + b4χi + b5Zg =( 1+f)
−1 + b1ei.
Solving for ei yields:
ei =







































and Yg ≡ (Zg,y g,) this equation is the same as (8).
8.2 Derivation of conditional moments (16) and (17)
For each group g that comprises Ng individuals in the population of interest,
we have a random sample of size ng ≤ Ng.D e n o t e w i t h es
g the sample
mean of concealed income in group g, and manipulate the data in terms
of within-group (w) and between-group (b) deviations from the respective
means, with the cross-group mean conditioned on observable group-level





























g is simply the within-group sample variance of tax evasion,
normalized by population size, while Gb
g is the square deviation of group
average evasion in the sample from the conditional population mean, minus
a correction term to account for the discrepancy between sample and pop-
ulation means. The role of this correction term is made clear below. The
purpose of these statistics is to derive an estimator based on the variance of
concealed income at diﬀerent levels of aggregation. Notice that after using
individual-level data to construct Gw
g and Gb
g, the analysis uses only these
transformations and (cg,W g), that is aggregate group-level data: jurisdic-
tions, not individual taxpayers, are the units of observation.
The normalized conditional within-group variance of concealed income,
within the jurisdictions deﬁned by (cg,W g), can be computed by taking
the conditional expectation of (21), as expressed in equation (13). In what
follows we will use equation (11):
ei = γαg + εi +( γ − 1)εg.
Assume, without loss of generality, that E(εi|Ng,n g,W g)=0 .25 Then,
the conditional mean of concealed income is:
25Notice that this is an assumption about the theoretical mean. The sample mean, as
































(γαg + εi +( γ − 1)εg − γαg − εg − (γ − 1)εg)
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where we abbreviate σ2
ε (Wg) and σεε (Wg) with σ2





























that is equation (13). Similarly, the between-jurisdiction conditional vari-
ance can be computed by taking the conditional expectation of (22), as








(eg − E (ei|ν,ω))
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where V denotes variance. Denote with εs
g the sample mean of individual
characteristics in group g, as opposed to population mean εg.T h a n w e
can write the ﬁrst term in this equation, i.e. the between-group conditional
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where we have again, for brevity, omitted the argument of the conditional






































































































and the last two terms on the RHS cancel out. Therefore this equation re-
duces to equation (14).
298.3 Some useful properties of the covariance
Three basic properties of the covariance are used in the previous derivations.
We summarize them here for convenience. First, for any sequence of n
random variables Xi with common variance σ2





































Second, for the same sequence and another random variable Y whose

































































30Figure 1a. Distribution (kernel density estimates) of concealed
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31Figure 1b. Distribution (kernel density estimates) of concealed
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32Figure 1c. Distribution (kernel density estimates) of concealed
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33Table 1. Concealed income and tax audits.
12 3 45
Region Evasion Jurisdictions Audits Population Intensity
Aosta Valley 36.8% 2 267 6,852 3.9%
Piedmont 37.6% 38 6,887 237,068 2.9%
Lombardy 32.5% 60 12,634 520,765 2.4%
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 56.3% 10 1407 65,208 2.2%
Trentino-Südtirol 45.0% 12 1067 50,697 2.1%
Veneto 50.4% 31 4,840 259,584 1.9%
Liguria 45.6% 10 3,661 95,602 3.8%
Emilia-Romagna 37.5% 24 6,056 248,353 2.4%
Tuscany 40.7% 34 5468 215,758 2.5%
Marche 46.5% 14 2,122 88,906 2.4%
Umbria 35.5% 10 1,257 43,581 2.9%
Lazio 52.1% 14 5,729 273,343 2.1%
Abruzzo 44.6% 13 2,413 66,495 3.6%
Molise 67.1% 4 569 15,194 3.7%
Campania 55.5% 27 6,720 228,824 2.9%
Basilicata 57.2% 11 1056 27,335 3.9%
Apulia 68.4% 16 4,968 195,460 2.5%
Calabria 66.1% 31 2,848 84,175 3.4%
Sicily 54.4% 40 4,219 217,394 1.9%
Sardinia 56.1% 11 1,500 73,717 2.0%
Italy 46.4% 412 75,688 3,014,311 2.5%
Note to Table 1. Column 1: concealed income as % of taxable income.
Column 2: number of tax jurisdictions. Column 3: total number of audits
perfomed. Column 4: number of self-employed individuals. Column 5: total
number of audits as % of number of self-employed individuals.
34Table 2. Concealed income by sector.







Other commercial activities 32.8
Transports and communication 36.8





Note to Table 2. The table reports concealed income as % of taxable
income by sector of economic activity
35Table 3. Small and large tax jurisdictions.
Region Jurisdictions Audits
# Small Large Small Large
Aosta Valley 2 1 1 67 200
Piedmont 38 29 9 3,380 3,507
Lombardy 60 52 8 6,108 6,526
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 10 7 3 483 924
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol 12 8 4 440 627
Veneto 31 25 6 2,239 2,601
Liguria 10 7 3 1,675 1,986
Emilia-Romagna 24 19 5 2,876 3,140
Tuscany 34 28 6 2,705 2,763
Marche 14 10 4 1,020 1,102
Umbria 10 7 3 464 793
Lazio 14 11 3 2,441 3,288
Abruzzo 13 9 4 1,076 1,337
Molise 4 2 2 193 376
Campania 27 21 6 3,165 3,555
Basilicata 11 7 4 472 584
Apulia 16 11 5 2,291 2,677
Calabria 31 21 10 1,115 1,733
Sicily 40 33 7 3,572 3,862
Sardinia 11 8 3 696 804
Italy 412 316 96 36,478 42,385
Note to Table 3. The table decomposes the number of jurisdictions
and audits by small and large jurisdictions. A small jurisdiction is deﬁned
as a jurisdiction whose size in terms of auditable self-employed is below the
regional median.
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